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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHEVRON 
vs. 
CRAIG W. 
and 
R. KENT 
CHEMICAL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff-
MECHAM, 
Defendant-
l ."' 
HEILESON, 
Defendant. 
-Appellant, ) 
-Respondent, ) 
Case No. 14423 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CRAIG W. MECHAM 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant ("Chevron") obtained a judgment against Respondent 
("Mecham"), a Utah resident, in Idaho on instruments by which 
Mecham had guaranteed the payment of certain financial obligations 
of an Idaho corporation, Great Basin Grain Company ("Great Basin") 
Process was served and in personam jurisdiction was claimed under 
the Idaho long arm statute- When Chevron attempted to enforce 
the judgment in Utah, Mecham defended on the ground that the 
Idaho court was without jurisdiction and its judgment void. 
Chevron's statement of the nature of the case assumes facts 
which simply do not and were found not to exist. 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court ruled that there had been a failure of 
due process in the Idaho proceedings and that the Idaho judg-
ment was void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Chevron has taken no exception to the findings of the 
trial court, and its formal findings must be accepted as true. 
For the court's convenience we reproduce those findings here. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
11
 1. Plaintiff, Chevron, is a Delaware corporation, a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil of California, doing business in 
many states, including California, Oregon, Idaho and Utah. 
Chevron has principal offices in Oregon and California and is 
qualified as a foreign corporation in both Idaho and Utah~ 
2. Defendant Mecham has always been a resident of the 
State of Utah. 
3. Chevron, in this action, sought to enforce a judgment 
entered against Mecham on the 13th day of February, 1975, in the 
District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho. 
4. Chevron's case against Mecham in Idaho involved two 
separate and distinct causes of action. 
A. The first cause of action (Count I of the 
Idaho Complaint) involved a guaranty agreement, 
dated 31 July 1968. 
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B. The second cause of action (Count II of the 
Idaho Amended Complaint) involved a guaranty 
agreement, dated 29 October 1968-
C. The first cause of action was filed July 1, 
1971, and the second cause of action was 
added nearly a year later on May 23, 1972. 
THE OPERATIVE FACTS INVOLVING COUNT ONE 
OF THE COMPLAINT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
5. In 1968, Great Basin was formed as an Idaho corporation. 
Mecham was an officer from formation until April of 1970 when he 
completely disassociated himself from Great Basin and advised 
Chevron in Portland, Oregon, he had done so. 
6. Chevron brought the action in Idaho against Mecham 
as an individual. 
7. As a Great Basin officer, Mecham made one trip to 
Idaho. He made no contacts with any customer, or supplier, or 
lending institution but discussed with defendant Heileson, 
President of Great Basin Grain, only internal financial affairs 
of Great Basin. 
8. As an individual, Mecham never asserted a business 
presence in Idaho. He never had a telephone listing or a business 
address in Idaho. He never advertised in Idaho. He never ini-
tiated or consummated a business transaction in Idaho. 
9. In July of 1968, plaintiff, Chevron from Portland 
solicited Mecham in Salt Lake to execute an instrument guarantee-
ing Great Basin's open account. On no occasion did Mecham ask 
Chevron to extend credit to Great Basin. The instrument of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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guaranty was prepared by Chevron in Portland and in no way 
identifies Idaho as the place where merchandise would be 
delivered or paid for on the guaranteed credit. The instrument, 
after Mecham*s execution of it in Salt Lake, was returned to 
Chevron in Portland. All payments on Great Basin accounts with 
Chevron were mailed to Portland. Mecham terminated said guaranty 
by mailing notice to Chevronfs Portland Office. 
10. All correspondence between Chevron and Mecham with 
respect to the guaranty of July, 1968, took place between 
Portland, Oregon, and Salt Lake City, Utah. 
11. Mecham made a special appearance in Idaho to challenge 
the long-arm jurisdiction of the court on Count I of the complaint. 
12* The Idaho court ruled it had jurisdiction on Count I 
only, based solely upon Mecham1s relationship to Great Basin 
as an officer and director of the Idaho corporation, even though 
Chevron did not sue Mecham as a corporate officer-., 
13. No Idaho resident testified at the trial of Count I -
Mecham1s witnesses were all residents of the State of Utah, and 
Chevron's witness was from the State of California. 
THE OPERATIVE FACTS INVOLVING COUNT II 
OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINTS ARE AS 
FOLLOWS: 
14. At the request of the Bank of Salt Lake, a Utah 
corporation with its offices in Salt Lake City, Mecham, on 
October 29, 1969, executed a second guaranty agreement by which 
he (as a co guarantor with Chevron) guaranteed an obligation 
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of Great Basin to the Bank of Salt Lake. That instrument was 
prepared in Salt Lake City by the Bank of Salt Lake, a Utah 
corporation, and executed in Salt Lake by both Mecham and the 
bank. 
15. On April 24, 1972, Chevron took an assignment from 
the Bank of Salt Lake of the bank's cause of action against 
Mecham. The instrument of assignment was prepared by Chevron 
at its Portland office and mailed from there to the Bank of 
Salt Lake in Utah where it was executed, -
16. Chevron amended its complaint in Idaho to assert an 
action against Mecham based on the Bank of Salt Lake guaranty; 
and that action became Count II of the original cause of action, 
and the Complaint was thereafter twice amended.-
17. Mecham was not served with legal process on this new 
and added cause of action, Count II, on the occasion of any 
amendment to the Complaint. {iSeeTuU uCb)XdahoXuUs) &-/3z) 
18. In his answer to all amended complaints, Mecham 
denied the jurisdiction of the Idaho Court and reserved the 
jurisdictional issue. 
19. At no time did the Idaho Court, in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment, or otherwise, resolve or 
determine the issue of jurisdiction with regard to the Count II 
cause of action. 
20. All negotiations and communications involving the 
guaranty of the Bank of Salt Lake loan took place between Portland, 
Oregon, and/or the Fresno, California office of Chevron and the 
Bank of Salt Lake at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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21. The final judgment of the Idaho court does not 
distinguish between relief afforded under Count I and relief 
afforded under Count II or any other Count. 
22. The Idaho judgment is ambiguous in the following 
particulars: 
A. There is a blank space in the judgment instrument 
where an amount should have been stated. 
B. Judgment was entered against, Mecham on counts 
of the Complaint which referred only to Heileson-
C. On the same causes, one judgment was entered 
against Heileson alone and another against Mecham 
and Heileson jointly and severally, but 
the judgments are for different amounts.1 
In Chevron's recital of facts, there are some errors 
(i.e. clear departures from the trial court's findings) which 
are perhaps forgiveable as reflections of an advocate's conviction 
of his client's rectitude. The concluding sentence of Chevron's 
statement of facts, however, is without support in the record and 
is a false representation, we believe, of a fact which is certainly 
material as Chevron argues this case. That sentence reads: 
"Heileson was served in Idaho11. There is appended to this brief 
an affidavit of R. Kent Heileson that he was a resident of Utah 
at the time the Idaho action was amended to add him as a defendant. 
It is not our purpose to attack counsel; we believe counsel is 
honestly mistaken. Chevron must provide the evidentiary support, 
however, for a fact on which it so heavily relies. 
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ARGUMENT 
While this court has had recent occasion to consider 
long arm problems, a short historical summary may be helpful 
before the specific issues of this case are addressed. 
HISTORY OF LONG ARM STATUTES*1* 
Judicial analysis of constitutional limits on jurisdiction has 
developed entirely under the principles of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714 (1877), the Supreme 
Court held that due process requires "service of process within the state 
or [the defendant's] voluntary appearance" before in personam jurisdiction 
can be asserted. Since Pennoyer, the enforceability of foreign judgments 
in the state of the defendant's residence has depended completely on whether 
he was afforded due process rather than upon any construction of the full 
faith and credit clause. For half a century after Pennoyer, it v/as a sacred 
principle of constitutional law that in personam jurisdiction was obtainable 
only by personal service of process in the forum state. 
The erosion of the Pennoyer doctrine began with enactment of statutes 
providing that one who brought a dangerous instrumentality, such as an auto-
mobile, into the state could be said to have appointed the Secretary of State 
to be his process agent. These were held constitutional in Hess v. Pawloski, 
274 US 252 (1927) on the reasoning that the state has a special or urgent 
interest in the dangerous instrumentality situation and a duty to protect its 
citizens. In Doherty and Co. v. Goodman, 294 US 623 (1935) the court held 
(1) The Court is referred to 69 Michigan Law Review 300 for an extensive 
review. 
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that a state has a special interest in regulating the sale of securities to 
its citizens and could provide for a foreign issuer to be sued within the 
state by service on the issuer's agent in the state. 
The most cited case in full faith and credit literature is Inter-
national Shoe v. Washington, 326 US 310, a 1945 case which announced what is 
generally recognized as the modern doctrine with regard to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. "Due process required/said the court, "only that the defendant 
have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice." 
In the ensuing thirteen years, the high court addressed itself to 
long arm issues in Perkins v. Benquet Mining, 342 US 437, McGee v. Inter-
national Life Insurance, 355 US 220, and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US 235, 
after which it left the development of standards for fairness pretty much 
to the circuits. These cases expand on the International Shoe doctrine. 
Each case acknowledges that our legal tradition is opposed to long arm juris-
diction, but finds special equities in the particular facts of the case which 
justify the forum state's assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident. 
The Supreme Court decisions provide few specific or objective criteria, 
and (because they expound equity principles) they make liberal use of such 
subjective terms as "minimum," "substantial," "fair play" and "justice." The 
circuits have, however, developed relatively objective standards which are 
widely applied. In Electrocraft v. Maxwell Electronics, 417 F2d 365, the 
Eighth Circuit identified these five factors which should be considered in 
determining whether the International Shoe standards of due process are met: 
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1. The nature and quality of contacts with the forum state 
2. The quantity of those contacts 
3. The relation of the cause to the contacts 
4. The interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its 
residents and 
5. The convenience of the parties 
Of these criteria, the "interest of the forum state" is perhaps the only one 
which requires explanatory comment. It relates to the concept (as per Hess 
and Doherty) that a state has a duty to afford a remedy within its judicial 
system for its citizens who have been wronged by foreigners acting, in some 
sense, within the forum state. In virtually all cases where the forum state's 
assertion of in personam jurisdiction has been upheld, the forum state has 
at least arguably been acting as a protector of its citizens from a non-resident 
who solicited or otherwise contacted them within the forum state. 
The Tenth Circuit has adopted essentially the Electrocraft standards 
with emphasis on the idea that the propriety of the forum state's assertion 
of jurisdiction is to be determined on equitable principles. In Misco Leasing 
v. Vaughn, 450 F2d 257 (197T), the court talks about the elements of substan-
tive due process in the long arm context as follows: 
"(1) the nonresident must purposefully do some act or con-
summate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the claim 
for relief must arise from, or be connected with, such act or 
transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the 
forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice, consideration being given to the 
quality, nature and the relative convenience of the parties, 
the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state 
afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of 
the situation" (court's emphasis). 
Moore (Federal Practice, Sec. 4.25, 2nd ed, 1967) sets up these 
guidelines for resolving the jurisdictional issue: 
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"If there are substantial contacts with the state, . . . and 
if the cause of action arises-of [sic] the business done in 
the state, jurisdiction will be sustained. If there are sub-
stantial contacts with the state, but the cause of action does 
not arise out of these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained. 
If there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises 
out of the contacts, it will normally be fair and reasonable to 
sustain jurisdiction. If there is a minimum of contacts and the 
cause of action does not arise'out of the contacts, there wi11 
normally be no basis of jurisxliction,, since it is difficult to estab-
lish the factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable test." 
It is clear, in any event, that whether in personam jurisdiction over 
a non-resident has been constitutionally asserted seldom depends on the nature 
of the claim (i.e. is it a tort, contract, or guaranteed credit case) unless 
the subject matter is such that the forum state has a special and urgent interest 
in protecting its residents. It rather depends on the total equities of the 
particular proceeding. The facts should be examined in that light. 
POINT I 
MECHAM'S ACTIVITIES AS A GREAT BASIN 
OFFICER DO NOT JUSTIFY IDAHO'S ASSERTING 
OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER 
HIM WHEN HE IS SUED AS AN INDIVIDUAL 
Mecham was sued as an individual even though his only 
contact with Idaho was as a Great Basin officer. This was a 
specific finding of. the Utah court, and the Idaho complaint 
alleges no other basis of jurisdiction. 
In Van Kleek Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products 
Company, 24 U2d 63, 465 P2d 544, this Court considered the 
specific issue we here address. In that case, judgment was 
obtained in Idaho against Utah residents who were officers of 
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a corporation which had influenced or induced plaintiffs to 
obligate themselves to pay for the use of a machine for making 
ice cream bars. The machine was evidently defective. One of 
the Utah residents lived for two years in Idaho attempting to 
rehabilitate the machine in his capacity as a corporation officer. 
The trial court held and this Court affirmed that the 
activities of a Utah resident in Idaho as an officer of a 
corporation cannot serve as a basis for Idahofs asserting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over him as an individual. The 
judgment was held to be unenforceable in Utah. 
In the instant case, the equities more strongly favor 
the Utah resident. Mecham's miniscule activity in Idaho, even 
as a corporate officer, involved no contact with Chevron, any 
customer of Great Basin, or any lending institution. 
POINT II 
GREAT BASIN WAS NOT MECHAM'S AGENT AND 
GREAT BASIN'S CONTACTS IN IDAHO ARE NOT 
A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
In Point I of its brief, Chevron expresses a legal theory, 
that a corporation is the agent of its officers, which is entirely 
foreign to the whole concept of corporation law. Officers are 
agents of the corporation, but the reverse is not true. If it 
were true, all corporate officers would be liable for the debts 
of the corporations they serve, and one major objective of corp-
orate formation would be frustrated. This doctrine of corporation 
law is so well established as to require little discourse, but 
we refer the court to 19 Am Jur 2d 746, Corporations Section 
1341, for a text treatment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12 -
In support of its theory, Chevron cites Salter v. Lawn, 
294 F.Supp. 862, a. 19.68 Massachusetts case. On Chevronf s 
analysis, the case would seem to be directly opposed to Van 
Kleek, supra, which this court decided in 1970. The case 
cannot be cited, however, for the proposition that corporations 
generally are the agents of their officers; it is a "piercing 
the corporate veil" case. The defendant in Salter was found 
to have "organized, used, and controlled" the corporation for 
improper purposes and under circumstances which, in the court's 
view, were incompatible with his claim of isolation from the 
corporation. The case holds that there can be situations 
where the corporation is merely the alter ego of the individual, 
and the law will not permit him to use the corporate form as 
a shield. 
The principles which control in the absence of an aura of 
fraud are discussed in Ferrante Equipment Co. v. Lasker Colr.an Corp. * 
1971, 26 NY2d 280, 258 NE2d 202. "The mere fact that respon-
dent is a controlling shareholder", said the court, "will not 
subject respondent, as an individual, to in personam jurisdiction 
under the long arm statute unless the record would justify our 
piercing the corporate veil" (our emphasis). 
In the case at bar, we have no evidence of any improper 
conduct, no misuse of corporate machinery to serve personal 
ends, and not the slightest basis for postulating that Great 
Basin was Mecham1s alter ego. 
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In its Point I, Chevron takes pains to show the similarity 
between the statutes under scrutiny in Salter and the case at 
bar. Chevron assumes that the issue here is whether it complied 
with the Idaho statute. Compliance is not the issue. Neither 
the Idaho judiciary nor its legislature can detract from the 
rights a Utah citizen enjoys under the due process amendment. 
In the very recent case of Union Ski Company v. Union Plastics 
Corporation (filed March 31, 1976) this court expressed its 
position as follows: 
"It is undoubtedly true that effect should be given 
to the policy declaration in our statute, that the 
jurisdiction of our courts should be extended to 
protect the citizens of this State consistent with 
concepts of fairness and equal justice under due 
process of law. But the other side of the coin is 
that the rule of law should also protect our citizens 
from suits in other states, unless they have engaged 
in some conduct or activity there beyond a mere 
casual or transitory presence therein; and concomit-
antly, that the residents of our sister states should 
be given the same protections here as we expect our 
citizens to be accorded there." 
POINT III 
DEFENSE IN IDAHO IMPOSED AN UNJUSTIFIABLE 
HARDSHIP ON MECHAM, AND CHEVRON'S ARGUMENT 
TO THE CONTRARY IS NOT VALID 
Chevron argues in Point III of its brief that any hardship 
imposed on Mecham by trial in Idaho (proceedings consumed more 
than two years and involved some ten trips to Idaho Falls) was 
more than justified because, except for its employment of the 
Idaho long arm statute, Chevron would have to have brought two 
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suits, one in Idaho and one in Utah. We are not aware of 
authority for the notion that due process requireinents should 
be relaxed to solve procedural problems of plaintiffs. Chevron 
was quite aware when it solicited Mecham in Utah to execute 
the guaranty, that it was soliciting in two different states. 
It is unnecessary to consider the merits of Chevron's 
argument in this case because it is not true, as Chevron 
asserts, that Heileson was a resident of Idaho when the 
Idaho suit was commenced. The record does not support any 
such assertion. It is admitted by Chevron (p. 16 of its 
brief) that Heileson had moved from Idaho by the time of 
trial, and the attached affidavit of Heileson attests that 
he was a resident of Utah when Chevron brought the Idaho 
suit against him. 
The importance of serving the convenience of the parties 
is further discussed in succeeding sections of this brievf* 
It is not the policy of the law, however, to permit plaintiffs 
to select any convenient forum. Unless there are overriding 
social or equity factors, a person must still be sued in 
the state where he resides. 
POINT IV 
AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (COUNT I), 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
WERE NOT SATISFIED - MECHAM WAS NOT DOING 
BUSINESS IN IDAHO BY CORPORATE AGENT 
The mere fact that the Idaho court found that it had 
in personam jurisdiction as to the first cause of action does 
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in any sense conclude the issue. The judgment is subject 
to attack on jurisdictional grounds in Utah. Conn v. 
Whitmore, 9 U2d 250 (1959), 342 P2d 871 (Transamerica Title 
Insurance Co. v. United Resources, Inc., 24 U2d 346 (1970), 
471 P2d 165) 
"While the judgment entered in the Idaho court 
contained a recital that the court had jurisdiction 
over the defendant, that recital was not binding 
upon the courts in Utah and the District Court of 
Salt Lake County was not precluded from making an 
independent determination as to the Idaho court's 
jurisdiction over the individual defendants here" 
Van Kleek v. Western Frozen Products, 24 U2d 63 
(1970) 465 P2d 544. 
Chevron does not question Mecham's right to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the Idaho court. 
To determine whether minimal contact and due process 
standards have been met, it is appropriate to judge the facts 
of this case against the criteria of Misco Leasing v. Vaughan 
(stated at page 9 of this brief) and Conn v. Whitmore, supra, 
remembering that this is an action against Mecham as an indi-
vidual and not in any corporate capacity. 
1. WHAT WERE THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF MECHAM1S CONTACTS 
WITH IDAHO? 
Mecham was in Idaho once and then only in the capacity 
of corporate officer (R-135,217). His contact was only with 
Heileson, Great Basin1s President, and involved internal 
corporate concerns. 
2. WHAT WAS THE QUANTITY OF MECHAMrS CONTACTS IN IDAHO? 
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Mecham went to Idaho only as a corporate officer 
and only once, and he had two or three telephone calls from 
Heileson in Idaho when Mecham was in Salt Lake. He was in 
no sense active in Great Basin's business solicitation efforts 
(R-135,217). 
3. WHAT WAS THE RELATION OF MECHAMfS CONTACTS WITH 
IDAHO AND THE CAUSE OF ACTION? 
There was no relationship between Mecham1s contact 
with Idaho and the execution of the July 31st guarantee 
agreement. Mecham did not go to Idaho to seek financing 
for Great Basin, he didn't communicate with any Chevron 
representative in Idaho at any time, he didn!t execute the 
guarantee instrument in Idaho, deliver it in Idaho, or under-
take to perform any act in Idaho. The guaranteed transactions 
were not even necessarily Idaho transactions. Misco Leasing 
a n d
 International Shoe say the "claim for relief must arise 
from" the defendant's act in the forum state. There is no 
connection between Mecham1s conversations with Heileson and 
Chevronfs extension of credit. 
4. WHAT IS THE INTEREST OF IDAHO IN PROVIDING A FORUM 
FOR ITS RESIDENTS? 
We are not dealing here with a dangerous instrumen-
tality or an activity such as stock promotions from which the 
public requires protection. There is no public policy basis 
for Idaho's asserting jurisdiction at all. Chevron is, in 
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fact, only technically and secondarily a citizen of Idaho. 
It was not to serve the need for court access of foreign 
state entities like Standard of California that Idaho's 
legislature enacted a long arm statute. 
5. WHAT WAS THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PARTIES? 
Without any question, the trial of the case in 
Idaho imposed a major burden on Mecham. He and/or his lawyer 
had to make a minimum of ten trips to Idaho Falls, and his 
witnesses were also from Utah. On the first cause of action 
(Count I) not a single Idaho resident was used as a witness 
by either party. The litigation of the matter in Idaho 
entailed a minimum of 5,000 miles of travel for Mecham 
whereas Chevron, as much a citizen of Utah as of Idaho, 
could as easily have litigated in Utah (R-2, 193). 
Mecham!s contacts with Idaho as a corporate officer 
were ethereal; his contacts as an individual were non-existent 
(R-135,217). 
The emphasis of Misco Leasing and, indeed, of all Utah 
Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court cases on this subject, 
is on the "basic equities of the situation." There must be 
something about the situation of the litigants which makes 
it "unfair" for the plaintiff to have to sue the defendant 
in his state of residence. 
It is significant the United States Supreme Court in 
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 US 235 (1958) , in commenting on single 
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transaction jurisdiction in McGee v. International Life 
Insurance, 355 US 220, said: "But it is a mistake to 
assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all 
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. 
See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 US 416, 418. Those 
restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from 
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence 
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective 
states. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign 
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless 
he has had the "minimal contacts11 with that state that are 
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him". 
In their 1966 treatise on this subject (79 Harvard Law 
Review 1121), Professors von Mehren and Trautman suggest 
that one of the equities which should be given significant 
weight is the comparative geographical extent of the activities 
of the litigants. Interestingly, the cases they analyze are 
exclusively cases where the plaintiff has a highly localized 
existence and the defendant has a multi-state business activity. 
The situation here (where Chevron is the ubiquitous party and 
simply chooses to sue in a state other than the one of which 
both parties are residents) is apparently unique. In support 
of their thesis, the authors say: 
"The insurance cases illustrate this proposition 
splendidly; insurance companies are engaged in 
extensive multistate activity, and their economic 
and legal existence is not localized; on the other 
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hand, plaintiffs who bring actions against 
an insurance company typically lead a localized 
economic and legal existence. Under these cir-
cumstances it is appropriate to reverse the 
traditional jurisdictional preference accorded 
the defendant." 
The corollary is even more obviously true. Where Chevron 
is engaged in extensive multistate activity, including 
activity and corporate qualification in the state of Mecham's 
residence, and Mecham leads a localized legal and economic 
existence, it is inappropriate to reverse the traditional 
jurisdictional preference accorded this defendant. 
It is not surprising that, in a kind of litigation where 
equity principles control, we find courts reaching different 
results in cases which involve the same category of relation-
ships. In the instant case, we deal with the relationship 
between a guarantor and a guaranteed creditor. There are 
many cases where a creditor's judgment against a non-resident 
guarantor has been held unenforceable in the state of the 
defendant's residence, and there are one or two cases where 
such a judgment has been sustained. We make this observation, 
merely to assure the court that there is nothing about the 
guarantor-guarantee creditor relationship which sanctifies 
it for the purposes of long arm statutes. We do not consider 
the nature of the relationship to have major significance. 
Perhaps the least involute of the guarantor defendant 
cases is DEB Adjustment Company v. PiHard, Colo.App. 5 08 
P2d 420. In that case the defendant guaranteed her son's 
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note in favor of a Colorado private school which the son 
attended. Neither mother nor son was a Colorado resident. 
The school sued both under the Colorado long arm statute. 
The court held the son was properly sued (he had come to 
Colorado, negotiated the loan, attended the school) but 
that the mother, who had merely executed the guarantee in 
California and mailed it to Colorado, was not subject to 
Colorado in personam jurisdiction. We submit that the 
instant case is as free of complication. Mecham stands in 
no closer relationship to Great Basin than a mother to her 
son, and Mecham didn't even communicate with or mail anything 
to Chevron in Idaho. 
In Misco Leasing v. Vaughn (the 1971 Tenth Circuit case 
cited above), the court held the Kansas court's assertion of 
jurisdiction over an Oklahoma guarantor of payments due a 
Kansas lessor by an Oklahoma equipment lessee did not satisfy 
due process even though the lease agreement specified Kansas 
law would control and payments were made in Kansas. In 
Misco Leasing, the defendant Vaughn was a shareholder of 
the corporation for whom the credit was guaranteed. "The 
guaranty agreement was signed in Oklahoma City, but stated 
on its face it was dated at Kansas". In Misco Leasing, two 
states, Kansas and Oklahoma were involved. In our case, 
four states, Oregon, California, Idaho and Utah were involved. 
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In Ferrante Equipment Co. v. Lasker Goldman Corp., 26 
NY2d 202 (1971), full text of decision (R-110), the non-
resident defendant was the controlling shareholder in a 
corporation which was doing business in New York. He executed 
an indemnity agreement (in essence a guarantee of the corpora-
tion's credit) in New Jersey. The New York court held the 
circumstances did not warrant assertion of long arm jurisdic-
tion. SAID THE COURT: 
"The mere fact that respondent is a controlling 
shareholder in the Ferrante Equipment Company, a 
corporation concededly doing business in New York 
and plaintiff in the main action herein, will not 
subject respondent, as an individual, to in personam 
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute unless the 
record would justify our piercing the corporate veil. 
Since there has been no such showing, we must assume 
that the corporation was a separate and independent 
entity; and for that reason, only the acts of re-
spondent, as an invididual, may be considered in 
determining whether enough has been shown to 
sustain jurisdiction. . . . 
Appellant argues that although respondent's acts 
occurred in New Jersey, they had a substantial 
effect on the performance of the New York job and 
for that reason we should sustain jurisdiction 
under CPLR (subd. (a) par. 1). This position is 
untenable. As the majority in the Appellate Division -
wrote: "The fact that the subcontract for which 
the (appellant's) performance and payment bond was 
given was to be performed in New York was insufficient 
to sustain jurisdiction against (respondent). He 
is being sued personally upon the indemnity agreement. 
The liberal statutory criterion (CPLR 302 subd. (a), 
par. 1) is not met by the unilateral acts of others 
engaged in performance of the subcontract in New 
York, nor by the circumstance that the (respondent) 
nondomiciliary may derive 'commercial benefit1 from 
such contract. The mere receipt by a nonresident 
of benefit or profit from a contract performed by 
others in New York is clearly not an act by the 
recipient in this State sufficient to confer juris-
*~ - , | . - . _ . -J 
diction under our long-arm statute." (emphasis added) 
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In analyzing Ferrante, Chevron finds distinction from 
the case at bar we are unable to comprehend. As we read it, 
the case flatly says that a non-resident's guarantee of a 
forum state creditor is not a sufficient basis for long 
arm jurisdiction, and you don!t add enough equities to 
overcome the traditional preference for the defendant by 
showing that the guarantor is a shareholder of the debtor 
and expecting profit from its operations. 
"Theory of piercing the corporate veil" could 
not be employed, without offending traditional 
notions of due process, to find personal juris-
diction over individual defendants in patent 
infringement action merely because court had 
personal jurisdiction over corporations with 
which they were so intimately associated.ff 
(Stanley Works v. Globe Master, Inc., 4 00 F. 
Supp* 1325 (1975)) 
"Illinois law does not authorize this Court to 
assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident 
individual merely because a corporation by which 
he is employed, with which he contracts or of 
which he is a stockholder, is itself subject to 
such jurisdiction. Indeed were Illinois law to 
be construed otherwise, the Court should have 
little doubt that it would violate the Constitution* 
See Schoettle v. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., D*C.E.D. Pa. 
1958, 167 F.Supp. 172." Insull v. New York World 
Telegram, 172 FED Supp. 634. 
The Illinois case has special significance because Idaho pat-
terned its long arm statute after Illinois. 
The New York Supreme Court, in a case on a promissory note 
similar to the First Citizen Bank case (INFRA) cited by Chevron: 
"held that where defendant foreign corporation 
transacted no business whatever in New York, 
where no purposeful act was committed by it in 
New York, and where the note sued upon was executed 
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and delivered in Arizona, defendant's contacts 
with New York were not sufficient to enable 
plaintiff corporation, the payee, to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over defendant by service 
of process outside of New York, notwithstanding 
that amount of note was payable to plaintiff in 
New York in seven installments, and that note 
was given for services rendered by plaintiff 
in obtaining mortgage commitment from bank 
located at New York to finance purchase and 
development of property in Arizona." 
As was aptly stated by the court in McKee Electric Co. 
v. Rauland-Borg Corp., supra, at p. 383, 283 N.Y. 2d at . 
p. 38, 229 N.E. at p. 607: 
"In our enthusiasm to implement the reach of 
the long arm statute (CPLR 302), we should not 
forget that defendants, as a rule, should be 
subject to suit where they are normally found, 
that is, at their preeminent headquarters, or 
where they conduct substantial general business 
activities. Only in a rare case should they be 
compelled to answer a suit in a jurisdiction with 
which they have the barest of contact." 
Hubbard, Westervelt v. Harsh Building (1967) 
284 NYS 2d 879 
"It is settled that jurisdiction over individual 
officers and employees of a corporation may not 
be predicated merely upon jurisdiction over the 
corporation itself." Wilshire Oil Company v. 
Riffe, 409 F. 212, 1281 N. 8 (10th Cir. 1969) 
Chevron cites First Citizen Bank v. McDaniel, 197 SE2d 
556 (1973) in support of its claim. There the court held North 
Carolina had jurisdiction over a New Jersey citizen who endorsed 
a note payable in North Carolina. 
In Chevron's case there was no such promise by Mecham to 
pay Chevron in Idaho. All communications with Chevron and 
Mecham were between Utah and Oregon and any payment on the 
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guaranty would be made in either Utah or Oregon and not 
Idaho. Chevron did not have a business office in Idaho. 
The ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court in State Ex. 
Rel. Ware v. Hieber, 515 P2d 721 (1973) would appear to 
be contrary to Ferrante, Misco Leasing and D.E.B. Adjust-
ment, supra and completely out of harmony with" Utah long 
arm cases. The Chief Justice in Oregon dissented saying, 
"I am of the opinion that the proper forum for the litigation 
of the action brought by Black Diamond Enterprises, Inc. , 
against the Wares is the defendant's domicile.1* 
The case of which Chevron is proudest is Salter v. 
Lawn, 294 F. Supp. 882, a 1968 case before the Massachusetts 
federal district court. In that case, the court held that 
the resident corporation whose credit was guaranteed was 
so fully controlled and used by the non-resident guarantor 
and with such fraudulent intent that the corporation was the 
agent of the guarantor. The equities in that case were over-
whelmingly in favor of suit in the forum state. 
POINT V 
EVEN IF JURISDICTION WAS PROPERLY ASSERTED 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(COUNT I) IT WAS NOT PROPERLY ASSERTED WITH 
REFERENCE TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(COUNT II) OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINTS 
With regard to the first cause of action (Count I) of 
the complaint, the Idaho court at least made a jurisdictional 
determination when it acted on the motion to quash. In that 
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proceeding, the court ruled that Chevron was a citizen of 
Idaho for whose benefit the long arm statute was designed. 
With regard to the second cause of action (Count II) of 
the various amended complaints, it cannot even be said that 
the guaranteed creditor was a citizen of Idaho. Chevron 
simply went to the Bank of Salt Lake, purchased the bank's 
cause of action, and added that cause to its initial complaint 
as Count II after the Idaho court had ruled on the motion to 
quash as to the first cause of action. On the basis of the 
authorities we have heretofore cited, we can conceive of no 
basis on which the Bank of Salt Lake Could have proceeded 
against Mecham in Idaho nor can we conceive that it was in 
the "reasonable expectations" of the parties to the October 
29, 1968, guarantee agreement that Idaho would be the forum 
in the event of litigation related to that instrument. It 
is apparent that Chevron was satisfied that Idaho had a 
favorable legal climate for the kind of claim it wanted to 
assert and chose that forum without regard to due process 
considerations. 
It is a fundamental principle of the law of assignments 
that an assignee can acquire no greater rights than his 
assignor. If the Bank of Salt Lake could not assert the 
Count II action against Mecham in Idaho, neither could plain-
tiff as assignee. 
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POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENT UPON WHICH ACTION IS BROUGHT 
IS. VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW THERE HAVING 
BEEN A COMPLETE FAILURE OF PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Without regard to the propriety of the Idaho court's 
asserting in personam jurisdiction by reason of the nature 
of Median's .business activity within the State of Idaho, 
it is fundamental that the plaintiff must satisfy the 
procedural requirements of the Idaho statute before the 
court can properly assume jurisdiction. A failure to 
satisfy these requirements avoids a judgment of the state 
which renders the judgment. The basic principle is stated 
in Section 5 of Chapter 2 of the Restatement of Judgments 
as follows: 
"A judgment is void unless the state in which 
it is rendered has jurisdiction to subject to 
its control the parties or the property or statutes 
sought to be affected." 
In comment f,g" under that section, the committee makes the 
following comment: 
"g. JURISDICTION AS TO CAUSES OF ACTION ADDED OR 
SUBSTITUTED BY AMENDMENT. If a plaintiff brings 
an action against a defendant who is subjected to 
the jurisdiction of the court, whether by personal' 
service upon him within the State or by a substi-
tuted form of service while he is domiciled within 
the State or by his general appearance in the 
action or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the 
court over him continues although the complaint 
is amended, where the effect of the amendment is 
not to add or substitute a different cause of 
action from that stated in the complaint. 
The result is different, however, where by an 
amendment a different cause of action is added 
to or substituted for the original cause of 
action/if when' the amendment is made the defendant 
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is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the 
State. This is true whether or not notice of the 
amendments is given to the defendant. If no notice 
of such an amendment is given to the defendant, and 
judgment is rendered against him by default, a 
judgment for the plaintiff on the new cause of 
action is void. . . . Even if notice of the 
amendment is given to the defendant, the judgment 
for the plaintiff on the new cause of action is 
void because of lack of jurisdiction of the court 
over him. The fact that the court has acquired 
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to 
the original cause of action does not give the 
court jurisdiction over him as to other causes 
of action. In such a case the court cannot give 
a valid judgment against the defendants as to 
these other causes of action unless the defendant 
is not only given notice but is subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the court as to these causes of 
action. Thus, if the plaintiff brings an action 
against the defendant who is a non-resident of 
the State in which the action is brought and is 
served with process while temporarily within the 
State, and thereafter the plaintiff amends his 
complaint by adding or substituting a different 
cause of action against the defendant, the court 
has no jurisdiction to render a judgment against 
the defendant on the new claim, unless he is 
again served with process or otherwise subjected 
to the jurisdiction of the court as to the new 
claim. The result is the same, where the defendant 
was domiciled within the State when the plaintiff 
brought his action and was served at his place of 
residence, but was no longer domiciled within the 
State when the new claim was added or substituted. 
The result is the same also where the defendant 
was not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court but entered a general appearance in the 
action before the complaint was amended. 
It is immaterial whether the cause of action stated 
in the amended pleadings arose before the action 
was brought or subsequently to the bringing of the 
action. 
The fact that by statute or otherwise a plaintiff 
is permitted to add or to substitute new causes of 
action by amendment is not sufficient to give the 
court jurisdiction over the defendant as to such 
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new causes of action if at the time of the 
amendment the defendant is no longer subject Idaho 
to the jurisdiction of the State. Such pro- adopted 
visions are applicable only where at the Federal 
time of the amendment the State has jurisdic- Rules 
tion over the defendant; they are procedural about 
rather than jurisdictional. 1965 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
in Rule 5 that pleadings subsequent to the 
original complaint shall be served upon each 
of the parties affected thereby, but no service 
need be made on parties in default for failure 
to appear except that pleadings asserting new 
or additional claims for relief against them 
.- shall be served upon them in the manner provided 
for service of summons," 
The wisdom of the Restatement position could hardly be 
more clearly illuminated than in this case where Chevron sued 
Mecham in a foreign state on a claim which had barely arguable 
color of legitimacy as a long arm claim and, after the Idaho 
District Court had /£uled favorably as to jurisdiction on that 
claim, went into Mecham1s state and bought a new claim so 
that it could exploit to the point of absurdity the advantages 
of the Idaho legal climate. Mecham vigorously protested, and 
the Idaho court refused to make jurisdictional findings for 
the obvious reason that the evidence would support none. 
Among the factors appropriate to be considered 
in determining that collateral attack should be 
permitted are that 
11
 (a) the lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter was clear; 
(b) the determination as to jurisdiction 
depended upon a question of law rather 
than of fact; 
(c) the question of jurisdiction was not 
actually litigated; 
(d) the policy against the court's acting 
beyond its jurisdiction is strong." 
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 451 (2) (Supp. 
1948). See Restatement, Judgments § 10 (1942). 
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The question of jurisdiction has now been fully liti-
gated and determined favorably to respondent Mecham by the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. See, Trienies v. 
Sunshine Mining Company, 308 U.S. 66. 
It is significant that Chevron did not comply with 
Rule 5(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure with regard 
to service of pleadings. Rule 5(a) reads as follows: 
"Every order required by its terms to be served, 
every pleading subsequent to the original complaint 
unless the court otherwise orders because of numer-
ous defendants, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written 
notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
designation of record on appeal, brief and 
memorandum of law, and similar paper shall be 
served upon each of the parties affected thereby, 
but no service need be made on parties in default 
for failure to appear except that pleadings assert-
ing new or additional claims for relief against 
them shall be served upon them in the manner 
provided for service of summons in Rule 4." 
Plaintiff argues that once you have the defendant in court, 
you can serve his attorney whether or not your pleading 
asserts a new or additional claim for relief. The Idaho 
Rules, however, have been copied from the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure which have been interpreted to require personal 
services of a pleading which adds a new cause of action even 
though the defendant is already before the court represented 
by counsel in litigation with respect to which jurisdictional 
findings have been made. In Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 
851, the original complaint was for rescission of sale of 
stock and was served on the defendant under the terms of 
the Securities Act so that in personam jurisdiction was not 
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questioned. The amended complaint sets forth a common 
law action for rescission, based upon mutual mistake. 
The court held that service of the amended complaint 
could not be made upon counsel for the defendant. This 
is, of course, the position taken by the Restatement of 
Judgments* 
It is of controlling importance that,,as to the second 
cause of action (Count II), the Idaho court made no juris-
dictional findings whatsoever even though Mecham attacked 
the jurisdiction of the court at every opportunity. 
The failure of the plaintiff to follow the rules for . 
service and the failure of the court to make jurisdictional 
findings are fatal. There has been a complete disregard of 
due process. 
POINT VII 
THE UTAH CASES ARE NOT IN HARMONY WITH 
THE RULE THiVT A PERSONAL GUARANTEE MADE 
• TO CHEVRON IN PORTLAND OR A PERSONAL 
GUARANTEE MADE TO A SALT LAKE BANK SUBMITS 
THE SALT LAKE GUARANTOR TO THE JURISDICTION * 
OF IDAHO 
The Utah courts have required more than isolated contacts 
with the forum state to constitute doing business for purpose 
of long arm jurisdiction. 
Chevron admits that Mecham had no individual contact with 
the State of Idaho. At no time was Mecham engaged in the man-
agement of Great Basin and concededly he sold his stock and 
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disassociated himself as a stockholder during the time 
Great Basin was a viable active Idaho corporation. It 
was several months after Mecham withdrew from the corpora-
tion that it encountered financial problems all of which 
were beyond the knowledge and control of Mecham. 
Not a single Utah or Idaho long arm case supports 
Chevron's theory of jurisdiction without minimal contact 
with Idaho. In personam jurisdiction simply cannot be 
based upon the fact that Mecham was an officer and director 
of an Idaho corporation unless the corporate veil is pierced, 
and Mecham is shown to be an active participant in the Idaho 
corporation. 
This court unanimously held in Van Kleek Creamery v. 
Western Frozen Products, 24 U2d 63, 465 P2d 544 (1970) that 
even though the individual defendant had organized the 
defendant corporation and had spent approximately two years 
in Idaho to rebuild and put into operation an ice cream 
machine, the Idaho judgment against the individuals was 
not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah. The court 
cited International Shoe, supra and Conn v. Whitmore. 
"There must be some substantial activity which 
correlates with a purpose to engage in a course 
of business or some continuity of activity in 
the state so that deeming the defendant to be 
present therein is founded upon a realistic basis 
and is not a mere fiction. That this is so and 
that a single act or transaction does not suffice 
unless it fits into the above pattern is well 
established. 
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It is our conclusion that the trial court 
correctly determined that the offer was 
accepted in Utah and the contract entered 
into here." Conn v. Whitmore (1959) 9 U2d 
250, 342 P2d 871; in accord Dykes v. Reliable 
Furniture (1954) 3 U2d 34, 277 P2d 969; 
Transamarica Title Insurance Company v. 
UnitecPpesources (1970) 24 U2d 346, 471 P2d 
165; Hill ,v. Zale Corporation (1971). 25 U2d 
357, 482 P2d 332 (See therein the seven 
points for determining jurisdiction); Foreign 
Study League v v Holland-American Line (1972) 
27 U2d 442, 497 P2d 244; (See Justice Crockett's 
Dissent); Pellegrini v. .Sachs.& Son (1974) 522 
U Reporter 7 04; f - - - due process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to 
a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of suit does not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial 
• j u s t i c e ) , Pelligrini v. Sachs & Son (1974) 522 
U Reporter 7 04, ("The record shows that plaintiff 
corporation is authorized to do business in the 
State of Idaho as well as in the State of Utah") 
Transwestern General Agency v. Joe Campbell (1974) 
52 6 U Rep 3^ 18_6; Mack Financial Corporation v^ 
Nevada Motor Rentals (197*4) " 529 U Rep'4297 Hanks 
vJ Administrator of the Estate of Jens E. Jensen 
(1975) 531 U Rep 363; ("It is nonetheless true 
that our courts cannot take jurisdiction over 
a resident of another state simply for the con-
venience or desire of the plaintiff"); Kocha v. 
Gibson Products Co. (1975) 535 U Rep 680 . 
In Union Ski v. Union Plactics (March 31, 1976) 
Utah Reporter _ , the court stated " . . V . Notwithstand-
ing the asserted trend toward liberality in allowing the 
acquisition of jurisdiction, with which this court is generally 
in accord, it is significant to note that in Hanson v. Denckla, 
367 U.S. 2 5 (1958) decided subsequent to those cases, (McGee 
and International Shoe) the United States Supreme Court warned 
against too extended an application of those decisions: 
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"But it is a mistake to assume that this trend 
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions 
on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts, 
(citations) Those restrictions are more than a 
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or dis-
tant litigation. They are a consequence of 
territorial limitations on the power of the 
respective states. However minimal the burden 
of defendant in a foreign tribunal, a defendant 
may not be called upon to do so unless he has 
had the "minimal contacts" with that State that 
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over 
him. (citations) 
It is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws. (citations)" 
It is undoubtedly true that effect should be given to the 
policy declaration in our statute, that the jurisdiction of 
our courts should be extended to protect the citizens of this 
state consistent with concepts of fairness and equal justice 
under due process of law. But the other side of this coin is 
that the rule of law should also protect our citizens from 
suits in other states, unless they have engaged in some conduct 
or activity there beyond a mere casual or transitory presence 
therein; and concomitantly, that the residents of our sister 
states should be accorded the same protections here as we 
expect our citizens to be accorded there. 
The finding of facts(R-126) clearly show Mecham had no 
contact with the State of Idaho. 
See 27 ALR 3rd 399 for comprehensive annotation of state 
jurisdiction over nonresident. 
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POINT VIII 
HAVING BEEN MERGED IN THE IDAHO JUDGMENT/ 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (COUNT I) AND 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (COUNT II) ARE NO 
LONGER DISTINGUISHABLE, AND FAILURE OF 
DUE PROCESS WITH REGARD TO ANY PART OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS IS FATAL TO THE WHOLE 
Chevron argues that, even if the Idaho court failed to 
afford due process or lacked jurisdiction with regard to the 
second cause of action (Count II), the judgment is enforceable 
to the degree that it is based on the first cause of action 
(Count I). 
Chevron must contend, of course, that the Idaho judgment 
against Mecham can be bifurcated, and such contention is not 
in any sense supported by the judgment instrument itself (R-:*}. 
That instrument does not distinguish or purport to distinguish, 
between the counts; it is simply an order that judgment be 
entered "on plaintiff's complaint11 for a total of $28,055.33 
(R-5). This sum is an arithmetic total of all costs, awards 
and set-offs in connection with all counts of the complaint. 
It is not possible for the Utah court to lift out of the Idaho 
findings, a separate amount for each count since there are 
lump sum cost items and other inextricable interfingerings 
which relate to all causes of action. On the other hand it 
simply is not proper for Utah to resort to any Idaho findings. 
Chevron's only cause of action is the judgment itself. The 
original causes of action terminated in the judgment, which 
became the cause on which plaintiff sues in Utah- This is 
the position of the Restatement of Judgments (sees. 47-55) 
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and of the U.S. Supreme Court (Grubb v. Commission/ 281 U.S. 
470). Leflar, in American Conflicts of Laws, states the 
legal proposition at Sec. 73, page 168, as follows: 
"Generally speaking, the common-law effect of 
rendition of a judgment is the termination of 
the original cause of action sued upon. If the 
judgment be for the plaintiff, the original 
cause of action is merged in the judgment so 
that thereafter the judgment itself is the only 
existent cause of action, though it may itself 
be the basis of a later action, either in the 
same state or in another state. If the judgment 
be for the defendant, then there is no cause of 
action of any kind left in existence. Mistaken 
findings of fact or applications of law in the 
prior proceedings make no difference." 
In this case, the Idaho court made no jurisdictional findings 
with regard to any except the first count of the complaint, 
there was no effective service of any amended complaint, no 
contact by either Mecham or Chevron with Idaho on the Bank 
of Salt Lake transaction and a constitutional basis for Idaho's 
assertion of jurisdiction (as to any count but certainly as 
to the second cause of action, (Count II) does not exist. 
The judgment of the Idaho court is void, and segments of 
it are not salvageable. 
POINT IX 
THE IDAHO JUDGMENT IS AMBIGUOUS AND 
UNENFORCEABLE FOR LACK OF CERTAINTY 
(A) The Idaho judgment against Mecham on its face shows 
a blank space in which the court did not insert the amount, 
thus rendering the judgment questionable and unenforceable in 
Utah for lack of certainty. (See Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws, Section 436). 
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(B) The second and third amended Idaho complaints each 
contained four counts. As shown in these instruments, Count 
i an<3 Count II were directed against defendant Craig W. 
Mecham and Count III and Count IV were directed against R. 
Kent Heileson (see second and third amended complaints) 
(R-152, 161). 
The Idaho court in rendering two separate judgments, one 
against Heileson, September 5, 1974, and one against Mecham, 
February 13, 1975, on the same two counts, created an impossible 
enforcement problem for the Utah court. 
The Heileson judgment (R-16) shows on its face the Id^ho 
court rendered a personal (several) judgment on Counts I and 
II against Heileson even though these said counts were in 
fact expressly against only Respondent Mecham. 
The court thus having already adjudicated Count I and 
Count II, the effect of which was to dismiss these same two 
counts against Mecham and then six months later entering a 
merged judgment against Mecham on these same two counts, 
created an enforcement problem which the Utah court could not 
unravel without adjudicating the case on its merits. 
It should be noted also that the Heileson judgment on 
Count I and II is for a different amount than the merged 
judgment which includes these same two counts against Mecham. 
As shown, the judgment against Mecham is ambiguous and 
uncertain and this court should not order its enforcement in 
Utah. 
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CONCLUSION 
None of the factors which justify assertion of extra-
territorial jurisdiction can be shown in this case. Mechan 
was never in Idaho as an individual, his presence there as 
a Great Basin officer was virtually momentary and without 
influence on the events which gave rise to the cause of 
action. Chevron is as much a citizen of Utah as of Idaho, 
and litigation in Utah would have imposed no additional 
burden on Chevron. This is the classic situation in which 
rights of a Utah citizen should be protected. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
J&£ 
Respectfully submitted this y day of April, 197 6. 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
"JsL-d c'C^'^' ' S . /.sOt&'Z^S By 
FRANK J. /AtEEN 
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APPENDIX I 
A F F I D A V I T 
R. KENT HEILESON 
IN RE: CHEVRON CHEMICAL CO. V. CRAIG W. MECHAM AND 
R. KENT HEILESON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
R. KENT HEILESON, being first duly sworn, upon oath 
deposes and says that he moved from Idaho to Utah during 
March of 1972 and at all times thereafter has been a resident 
of Utah; that he was residing in Utah at the time he was added 
as a defendant in the Idaho case of Chevron Chemical Company 
v. Mecham and Heileson sometime in July of 1972. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of March, 
1975. 
/- • -SI ' ^ ' ' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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